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The Structure of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation: 
Change and Persistence in the German Model 
 
This paper depicts and examines the decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany. 
Using repeat cross-section and longitudinal data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show 
the overwhelming importance of behavioral as opposed to compositional change and, for the 
first time, document workplace transitions into and out of collective agreements via survival 
analysis. We provide estimates of the median duration of coverage, and report that the 
factors generating entry and exit are distinct and symmetric. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J50, J53 
  
Keywords:  sectoral and firm agreements, changes in collective bargaining/works council 






Faculdade de Economia 
Universidade de Coimbra 
Av. Dias da Silva, 165 
3004-512 Coimbra 
Portugal 




I.  Introduction 
Use  of  the  characteristics  of  collective  bargaining  to  help  motivate  analysis  of  wage  and 
employment  outcomes  occupies  an  important  position  in  contemporary  treatments  of  the 
covariation of institutions and macroeconomic outcomes. Thus, notions of the importance of the 
centralization of collective bargaining (or its absence) to wage and unemployment development 
figured heavily in policy discussions in the 1980s (Calmfors and Driffill, 1993). More recently, 
the  importance  of  centralization  has  been  supplemented  if  not  supplanted  by  notions  of 
coordination (OECD, 2004, Chapter 3).
 Vulgo: more centralized bargaining regimes – and latterly 
more  coordinated  ones  –  have  been  held  out  as  offering  scope  for  improved  economic 
performance. 
One important issue that has arisen is the stability of the underlying relationships. After 
all, it was the failure of the Swedish model that spawned the coordination thesis. Might not 
coordinated systems for their part also be subject to a possibly pre-set cycle of emaciation and 
decay? In any event, bargaining structures – centralized, coordinated, or otherwise – are typically 
observed at discrete points in time. Insufficient attention has been paid to within-country changes 
in the degree of centralization/coordination in collective bargaining regimes and correspondingly 
perhaps too much attention given over to shocks per se. In this sense, the literature on the role of 
bargaining structure is no different from that on the contribution of some other ‘key’ institutions 
such as employment protection and labor standards where time variation in regressors is at best 
sporadic.   
Yet we live in a time in which systems are said to be increasingly under stress. If so, they 
might be expected to evolve or fail. Nevertheless, there is in general very little discussion of the 
change in institutions outside of studies of the decline in union density (which phenomenon has 
tended to be associated in the Anglo-Saxon literature at least with the notion of a decline in the 
‘disadvantages’ of unionism; see, for example, Addison and Belfield, 2004). Although the change 
in  German  institutions  has  received  some  attention  in  the  wake  of  a  precipitous  decline  in  
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unionization, the research has proceeded in a patchwork fashion and remains controversial (see 
below).  One aim of the present treatment, therefore, is to offer a comprehensive and updated 
examination of the course of collective bargaining and worker representation in Germany since 
2000.  
In the present paper, we will first chart the extent of erosion in the twin pillars of the dual 
system  of  industrial  relations  in  that  nation.  Distinctions  will  be  made  between  western  and 
eastern  Germany,  between  large  and  small  firms,  between  manufacturing  and  services,  and 
between  surviving,  newly-founded,  and  failing  establishments.  We  also  model  changes  in 
collective  bargaining  using  shift-share  analysis,  providing  points  of  contact  with  a  German 
literature examining the determinants of union density (e.g. Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang, 2006) 
and the emerging consensus that changes in the composition of the workforce have played a 
minor role in the decline in union density (in our case, sectoral collective bargaining). 
We will also update an altogether sparser and typically cross-sectional German literature 
on  the  determinants  of  the  structure  of  bargaining  covering  both  the  application  of  sectoral 
agreements  and  their  abandonment.
1  The  novelty  of  our  analysis  stems  from  the  longer 
observation window during which plants and their collective bargaining status are being observed 
consecutively.  More  concretely,  collective  bargaining  ‘membership’  is  analyzed  within  the 
framework  of  an  unobserved  (random)  effects  probit  model,  while  empirical  discussion  of 
establishment  transitions  into  and  out  of  collective  bargaining  is  tackled  in  the  context  of  a 
survival model. We view these innovations as the principal contributions of the present study.   
 
II. A Brief Thematic Survey of Past Research     
There has been considerable discussion of the future of the German ‘model’ in recent years 
despite  the  continued  institutional  predominance  of  industry-wide  or  sectoral  collective 
bargaining. In particular, the practical locus of collective bargaining has shifted to lower levels, 
leading observers to question whether this development represents an ongoing process of erosion  
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or is instead indicative of the natural accommodation to changed circumstances of a flexible 
system.  
  Unambiguously  the  German  system  has  been  decentralizing.  Apart  from  embracing 
‘individual’ as opposed to collective bargaining, firms were initially to switch from sectoral to 
firm-level collective bargaining (Hassel, 1999). But sectoral agreements were also evolving to 
permit greater flexibility. The means included opening clauses and latterly pacts for employment 
and  competitiveness  (see,  respectively,  Bispinck,  2004;  Seifert  and  Massa-Wirth,  2005).  The 
issue has been whether the working out of such contractual innovations – particularly the latter – 
reflects a coordinated or managed decentralization or, in conjunction with declining collective 
bargaining coverage, a distinct change in model?  
Observers  such  as  Massa-Wirth  and  Niechoj  (2004:  22-23)  speak  of  a  process  of 
increasingly uncontrolled decentralization associated in particular with pacts – even in those cases  
where they are not in actual contravention of sectoral labor contracts. Other observers also see the 
seeds of ultimate destabilization in otherwise organized decentralization (i.e. where issues have 
been formally delegated from central level to the plant level) by virtue of the effects on the 
disparate  interest  membership  of  employers’  associations,  chiefly  large  versus  small  firms 
(Hassell, 1999).
2   
For  its  part,  orthodoxy  has  tended  to  stress  the  notion  of  transformation  without 
disruption.  Specifically,  it  has  been argued  that  German  employers  have  a  vested  interest  in 
maintaining the dual system, that the system possesses powerful flexibility, permitting adjustment 
to outsourcing and other major changes without conflict, that pervasive cooperation is the order of 
the day, and that the appearance of institutional instability is a response to the business cycle (see, 
respectively, Thelen and Van Wijnbergen; Streeck, 2001; Frege, 2003; Klikauer, 2002).  
Nevertheless, information on the facts of the case as reflected in the dual system as a 
whole  is  sparse.  Much  of  the  extant  literature  referred  to  earlier  tends  to  focus  on  sectoral 
bargaining alone (see, for example, Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003a, 2003b, 2007). Wider-ranging  
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analyses include the study by Addison et al. (2009), which covers the interval 1998-2004, and 
upon which the present treatment builds and the partial updates provided in German-language 
studies  by  Ellguth  and  Kohaut    (2008,  2010).  As  noted,  one  important  goal  of  the  present 
treatment  is  to  modernize  and  extend  the  focus  of  previous  research,  even  if  the  issue  of 
performance of the full range of institutions in question raised by this thematic review necessarily 
is the task of future research. 
 
III. Data  
Our data is extracted from the IAB Establishment Panel (or Betriebspanel). The Panel is based on 
a stratified random sample of plants from the population of all establishments with at least one 
employee covered by social insurance. The basis for sampling is the Federal Employment Agency 
establishment file, containing information on some 2 million establishments. Since good detailed 
descriptions of the Panel, which is conducted annually and now contains information on a little 
over 16,000 plants, are now widely available (e.g. Fischer et al., 2009), we choose here to confine 
our remarks to outlining the procedures used to generate our various estimation samples. 
First, given that we seek to offer a complete picture of the course of collective bargaining 
coverage over a sufficiently long period of time, we took the most recent survey available at the 
time of writing and appended all the previous surveys back to 2000. We decided not to range 
further  back  in  time  primarily  to  avoid  having  to  deal  with  material  changes  in  industry 
classification in 2000 (from a 3- to a 5-digit system). 
Second, we focus on establishments from the private, profit-oriented sector of the economy. 
For reasons connected with the need to include works councils in our sample, we also excluded 
establishments having less than 5 employees – the legal size threshold for the establishment of 
works  councils.  In  total,  we  have  some  82,000  observations  on  approximately  24,000 
establishments in the whole of Germany.   
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Third, the selected covariates – data-driven in the main and largely self-explanatory – are 
presented in Table 1. The principal covariates comprise two measures of workforce composition 
based on skill and gender, foreign ownership, single versus multi-site firm status, establishment 
age, establishment size, and an indicator of the state of technology in use. They are augmented by a 
total of thirty seven 2-digit industry dummies plus sixteen regional dummies. Although somewhat 
sparse, our choice of regressors is guided by the literature (notably, Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and 
Kohaut,  2006)  and  the  need  to  minimize  the  loss  of  establishments  occasioned  by  missing 
observations. 
(Table 1 near here) 
Fourth, the (nine) surveys selected are used in cross-section fashion to chart the main 
developments in collective bargaining and worker representation coverage (in section IV of the 
paper).  For  its  part,  the  constructed  longitudinal  dataset  –  namely,  the  panel  in  which 
establishments are followed over time for a maximum period of nine years (in the case of those 
plants  populating  all  surveys  from  2000  through  2008)  –  is  used  initially  to  examine  the 
determinants of collective bargaining (in sections V and VI) and thence the duration of collective 
bargaining status as either a covered or uncovered institution (section VII). 
Finally, observe that in general we do not know the elapsed duration of the observed 
spells. That is to say, we do not know the number of years in which a given establishment has 
been either covered or uncovered at the point it is first observed in the survey. As a result, all 
establishments are left-truncated, with the notable exception of the newly-founded establishments 
(i.e. births) that we were able to follow from the outset. One of our tasks therefore was to ensure 
that  the  year  of  birth  coded  in  the  survey  panel  was  correct.  To  this  end,  we  used  the 
establishment register (or Betriebsdatei) and the fact that establishments in the two raw datasets 
(i.e.  Betriebsdatei  and  Betriebspanel)  share  exactly  the  same  identification  code  (or 
Betriebsnummer). Further information on the construction of the different estimation samples is 
provided below.   
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IV. The Course of Collective Bargaining 
The extent of collective bargaining and worker representation is described in Table 2 and Figure 
1, where we distinguish between industry-wide and firm-level collective bargaining, an absence 
of collective bargaining, and works council presence. Coverage is given by employment and by 
establishment for Germany as a whole and its western and eastern halves. The most notable 
feature of Table 2 is the increase in the prevalence of no collective bargaining. This is largely the 
result of a fall in industry-wide or sectoral bargaining. Note that there has been little change in 
firm  collective  bargaining,  while  works  council  coverage  has  fallen  over  the  sample  period, 
despite the passage of legislation in 2001 designed to increase their coverage. These trends are  
graphed annually in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1 for employment and establishment shares, 
respectively.  Bargaining coverage, especially sectoral bargaining, is much lower in eastern than 
western Germany throughout the period, but the rate of decline in bargaining coverage is more 
pronounced in the latter region. 
(Table 2 and Figure 1 near here) 
Another  important  distinction  to  be  made  in  addressing  the  decline  in  traditional 
bargaining and the growth of bargaining-free regimes is establishment size. Figures 2 and 3 graph 
coverage  by  employment  and  establishment  for  plants  with  less  than  and  greater  than  250 
employees. First, it is clear that levels of sectoral bargaining are considerably higher in larger 
establishments and absence of collective bargaining correspondingly lower. Even more striking is 
the disparate coverage of works councils in establishments of different sizes. Whereas the vast 
majority of larger firms have councils, only a minority of smaller ones do so. Larger plants are 
also more likely to have firm-level collective agreements than their smaller counterparts, although 
the disparities here are very much smaller. 
(Figures 2 and 3 near here) 
In terms of changes in levels, however, the growth in bargaining-free regimes has been 
somewhat more pronounced in larger plants. The figures are reversed in respect of the declines in  
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sectoral bargaining and works council coverage. For sectoral bargaining, declines in coverage by 
employment  and  establishment  are  substantially  higher  among  smaller  plants.  In  the  case  of 
works  council  coverage,  rather  small  declines  are  observed  in  the  case  of  larger  plants  as 
compared with major declines in smaller plants. Finally, if anything modest upward trends in 
firm-level collective bargaining characterize both large and small establishments in terms of their 
employment coverage. 
(Figures 4 and 5 near here) 
Another  disaggregation  worth  pursuing  is  coverage  in  manufacturing  versus  that  in 
services. The situation is depicted in Figures 4 and 5. Again, the principal distinction is more one 
of levels than first differences. Thus, services are clearly differentiated from manufacturing by 
their lower incidence of traditional bargaining and correspondingly higher shares of bargaining-
free regimes, but over the period in question the decline in collective bargaining and the growth in 
no collective bargaining was fairly similar as between the two sectors. And while the decline in 
works  council  coverage  by  employment  was  much  more  sizeable  in  services  than  in 
manufacturing  broadly  similar  declines  in  establishment  coverage  were  observed  in  the  two 
sectors.  Finally,  the  employment  coverage  of  firm-level  agreements  grew  in  both  sectors, 
although establishment shares hardly budged.
3 
  To determine whether the observed changes in collective bargaining between 2000 and 
2008 are the result of behavioral or compositional factors we next turn to a shift-share analysis. 
(A parallel treatment of workplace representation is available from the authors upon request.) 
 
V. Shift-share Analysis 
The percentage point change in collective agreements (mean) coverage between 2000 and 2008 
can be decomposed into its Oaxaca-Blinder components: the between or compositional effect, and 
the within or behavioral effect. The between effect, or the ‘explained component,’ is that part of 
the observed change that can be attributed to differences in observable characteristics. The within  
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effect, or unexplained component, measures the change in coverage arising from differences in 
propensities (or coefficients). 
More  formally,  let  2008 2000 xb  be  the  2008  (predicted)  coverage  based  on  year  2000 
coefficients, where  x  denotes the mean vector of observed (establishment) characteristics and b  
indicates  the  vector  of  estimated  coefficients.  Then,  the  between  effect  is  given  by 
2008 2000 2000 () x x b  and the within effect by  2008 2008 2000 () x b b , where the reference groups are 
the year 2000 coefficients and the year 2008 characteristics, respectively. (A different choice of 
reference  groups  would  yield  2008 2000 2008 () x x b  and  2000 2008 2000 () x b b  for  the  between  and 
within effects, respectively.) 
For expositional convenience, our decompositions rely on linear estimates.
4 Following on 
the data description given in section III, our selected vector of covariates  x  includes establishment 
size, the proportion of skilled and female workers, and dummies for single-establishment status, 
foreign ownership, establishment age, state of technology, industry and region. 
The results from the shift-share exercise are presented in Table 3 for Germany as a whole 
and  for  eastern  and  western  Germany  separately.  Panel  (a)  of  the  table  refers  to  collective 
agreements of any type, while panel (b) refers to sectoral agreements. 
(Table 3 near here) 
  Three main findings emerge from the table. First, the within effect is overwhelmingly 
dominant, accounting for at least 90 percent of the observed change in coverage in either panel. 
Second, the decompositions in the two panels are very similar, which of course reflects the fact 
that the share of firm-level agreements is relatively small. Third, the declining coverage observed 
in  eastern  Germany,  while  less  pronounced  is  again  dominated  by  a  within  effect  of 
approximately the same proportion as in western Germany. Evidently, changes in the propensity 
of  being  covered  lie  at  the  root  of  the  decline  in  collective  agreements  irrespective  of  the 




We also note that given that the percentage point change over 2000-20008 is close to 
zero, the decompositions with respect to the changes in firm-level coverage – not reported in the 
table  –  are  something  of  a  curiosum:  the  between  and  within  effects  become  very  large  in 
percentage terms even if they are actually very small in absolute size.
6 Finally, we found no 
evidence  that  any  particular  variable  (or  set  of  variables)  is  driving  the  results  of  the 
decomposition described in Table 3. All individual composition (or characteristics) effects are 
small, and no individual within effect (attributed to any observable characteristic) is statistically 
significant, with the sole exception of the industry dummies. 
These findings would seem to suggest that unobserved establishment traits play a role in 
the observed decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany over the last decade.  We now 
turn to a closer examination of this issue. 
 
VI. Collective Bargaining Coverage Propensity 
We now take full advantage of the longitudinal nature of our panel to ascertain the determinants 
of coverage propensity. We will consider in particular the extent to which observations within an 
individual establishment are correlated over time. Since the outcome variable is a binary variable, 
we  shall  deploy  an  unobserved  (random)  effects  probit  model.  It  will  be  recalled  that  the 
maximum length of any individual time series in our panel is nine years (in the case of those 
establishments observed consecutively from 2000 to 2008). 
Let Yit represent the coverage outcome for the t
th observation in the i
th establishment. 
Given the random effect  i u  which represents the establishment’s persistent unobserved traits – its 
unobserved propensity to be covered – the random-effects probit model can be specified as 
Pr( 1| , ) ( ) it i it it i Y u X X u ,              (1)  
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where    is  the  standard  cumulative  distribution  function  and 
2 (0, ) iu uN ,  with  i u  
uncorrelated with  it X ;  X  includes all observed establishment characteristics that have an impact 
on the binary response probability; and  denotes the set of parameters to be estimated.
7 
Conditional on  ( , ) i it uX , outcomes Yi1, Yi2, …, YiT are independent, with probabilities 
depending on  i u  and  it X . This means that, conditioning only on  it X , Yi1, Yi2, …, YiT will be 
dependent  across  t.  A  useful  statistic  therefore  is  the  (latent)  intra-class  (establishment) 





, which indicates the relative importance of the  unobserved 
effect  i u   or  the  correlation  between  i it ue across  any  two  time  periods  (see,  for  example, 
Rodríguez and Elo, 2003). We will also exploit an additional measure of (manifest) association 
based on the actual binary outcomes  it Y , rather than on the latent variable 
*
it Y , namely Pearson’s 
r coefficient. Along with these measures, we will use other indicators evaluated with the linear 
predictor set at various percentiles, the goal being to have different measures of status persistence. 
Using the model in equation (1), the determinants of being covered by type of collective 
agreement are presented in Table 4. We retain in the sample all plants surveyed in the 2000-2008 
observation window, including those switching collective bargaining status more than once. As a 
practical matter, however, dropping the latter produced virtually no change in the results. Our set 
of covariates is unchanged from section V, and for expositional convenience we focus exclusively 
on Germany as a whole. The broad rationale for inclusion of these covariates can be found, for 
example,  in  Willman,  Bryson,  and  Gomez’s  (2007)  modeling    of  employer  voice-choice 
decisions. Based on the argument that firms face non-trivial switching costs (i.e. costs connected 
with uncertainty surrounding the benefits from moving from coverage to non-coverage, and vice-
versa), one would expect the returns to being covered by collective agreements to be higher in 
large establishments and in plants integrated in multi-site establishments. Establishments with a  
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higher proportion of low-skill employers are also likely to rely less on voice mechanisms and 
therefore expected to be associated with a lower presence of collective agreements. By the same 
token, older establishments are more likely to be covered given that the incidence of collective 
tended to be higher in the past. 
(Table 4 near here) 
From the first column of the table, which refers to coverage propensity by any type of 
collective agreement, it can be seen that establishment size and establishment age are positively 
and single-establishment firm status negatively associated with coverage. This propensity is also 
increasing in the skill composition of the workforce. The sectoral agreements case, given in the 
second  column  of  the  table,  mirrors  the  results  for  all  collective  agreements.  The  principal 
exception is the state of technology variable: more modern plants now evince a higher propensity 
to be covered by a collective agreement. Finally, from the third column of the table, we observe 
that the sign of the state of technology variable is reversed and that the association between plant 
age  and  coverage  by  a  local,  firm  agreement  turns  negative.  That  said,  given  the  statistical 
insignificance of the latter coefficient estimate, we have not uncovered evidence to favor the 
proposition that newly-founded firms are attracted by firm-level agreements, while the negative 
sign of the technology argument might suggest that firms facing more competition by reason of 
outdated technology may be those opting out of sectoral agreements. 
With  a  few  exceptions,  the  industry  and  region  dummies  are  statistically  significant. 
However, other than the lower propensity of eastern Germany establishments to be covered by a 
collective agreement, there are no obvious patterns in the data in this regard.  
Of interest is the high value of   throughout, indicating considerable inertia in collective 
bargaining status. In short, there is strong evidence that, controlling for  i X , the  probabilities of 
an establishment being covered in any t0 and t1 are highly correlated. (The presence of non-trivial 
switching costs may of course lie at the root of this outcome.)  Equivalently, the size of  u   
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(ranging  from  2.6  to  3.9)  implies  that  a small  difference  in  unobserved traits  entails  a quite 
different propensity of being covered by a collective agreement. We also note that since the 
significance test for ρ is itself a test for the presence of the unobserved (random) effect, we can 
reject the simple pooled probit as an appropriate model description of the data. 
(Table 5 near here) 
The manifest interclass correlation across distinct percentiles in given in Table 5.
8 We 
again focus on the any collective agreement case in panel (a) and on the median percentile. For an 
establishment with a median probability of being covered by any type of collective agreement 
(the  0.50  column),  the  inter-class  correlation  is  0.76,  flagging  a  substantive  within  group 
persistence. Note also that for the median percentile, the corresponding joint probability in the 
second row (viz. the probability of being covered in two given years) is equal to 0.47. In turn, the 
corresponding marginal probability of being covered by any type of agreement in any given year 
is 0.53 (first row), which is not too far away from the mean coverage rate observed in the sample 
of 52.7 percent (see Table 1). Finally, the odds ratio in the fourth row indicates that the odds of an 
establishment being covered in t0 and t1 versus not being covered in t0 but covered in t1 are 145 
times  higher for  the  same  observed  characteristics.  Since  the  odds ratio  contrasts  the  (same) 
behavior of two individuals (viz. establishments) in t1, given that in t0 they may have behaved 
differently,  the  conclusion  is  that  it  is  considerably  more  likely  that  establishments  that  are 
covered will stay covered than non-covered establishments will join. Inertia in non-coverage is 
therefore very strong as well. That said, there is much less persistence in firm-level bargaining.  
Finally,  by  squaring  the  Pearson’s  r  coefficient,  we  obtain  the  interesting  result  that 
collective  bargaining  coverage  in  a  given  year  explains  about  57  percent  of the  variation  in 
collective bargaining behavior in another year. The inference is that there is no terminal inertia in 
collective bargaining status, which result offers more than sufficient justification for an analysis 




VII. Transitions and Collective Bargaining ‘Survivability’ 
We have seen that certain characteristics are associated with collective bargaining coverage. But 
can we say for example that the longer lasting is its coverage, the less likely an establishment will 
be to change bargaining status? Our concern is now with the specific factors that induce failure, 
that is, transitions into or out of a collective agreement. The proper context for such analysis is 
survival modeling.  
In our observation window, we have a maximum of nine annual observations which is 
insufficient to allow us to follow all production units from outset (birth) to death. The typical unit 
in our panel is indeed one that was born before 2000 and surveyed over a certain number of years 
within the observation interval. Figure 6 illustrates the array of possibilities. Establishment A, for 
example, was born before 2000 and is observed consecutively from 2000 up to point e (exit from 
a given state or point of ‘failure’). Establishment A has therefore a left-truncation point as it is not 
possible to recover its bargaining status prior to 2000. Establishment B is not only left-truncated 
but  also  right  censored  as  well  since  it  rotates  out  of  the  panel  at  point  c.  For  their  part, 
establishments C, D and E are observed for a number of years up to (a) ‘failure’, (b)  self-rotation, 
and (c) right censoring (in 2008), respectively. Establishments F and G were born after 2000 and 
are, respectively, right censored and exiting a given state before 2008. Finally, there are those 
‘permanent’ establishments, represented by case H, which are both left- and right-censored (in 
2000 and 2008, respectively). In general, we will not be able to know the exact length of all spells 
because it is simply not possible to recover the ‘missing’ information. On the other hand, newly-
founded establishments – and, to some extent, permanent establishments – are a special case and 
they will be used to explain the survivability of collective bargaining. Again in the interests of 
expositional convenience, we focus on the aggregate category of collective agreements of any 
type. 
(Figure 6 near here)  
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In  the  limit,  the  probability  of  failure,  given  by  the  hazard  function,  is  constant  and 
independent of any establishment attribute. This case is not particularly helpful in the present 
context since we believe that the selected covariates do have an impact on the hazard rate. Thus, 
we  assume  that  leaving  (or  joining)  a  collective  agreement  of  any  type  is  a  function  of  an 
observed set of time-constant (e.g. industry dummies) and time-varying (e.g. establishment size) 
covariates.
9 
Our hazard function belongs to the family of proportional hazard (PH) models 
12 ( ; ) ( ) ( ) h t X k X k t ,                 (2) 
where  1 k  and  2 k  are the same functions for all individuals (establishments) and X  is the vector 
of the selected covariates (see, for example,  Lancaster, 1990, chapter 3). Setting   2( ) ( ) o k t h t  
and  1( ) exp( ) k X X , we have the standard proportional hazard Cox model 
0 ( ; ) ( )exp( ) h t X h t X ,                (3) 
where  0() ht is the baseline hazard (or the hazard rate when all covariates are set at zero).
10 Thus, 
() ht  denotes, for covered (uncovered) establishments, the probability of an establishment leaving 
(joining) a collective agreement of any type, given that it has been covered (uncovered) up to time 
t.  Given  the  longitudinal  nature  of  our  dataset,  the  standard  errors  of  the  estimated  hazard 
coefficients are adjusted to account for the possible intra-group (establishment) correlation. 
As mentioned earlier, we have both stock and flow sampling in our data, in the sense that 
we  are  able  to  observe  entrants  (newly-founded  establishments)  and  non-entrants  (i.e. 
establishments born at some point in the pre-observation period.
11 In the case of non-entrants, for 
whom left-censoring is the key problem, some further data manipulation will be required. For 
entrants, the survival analysis is straighforward since all spells for these units are either complete 
or right censored. In this context, the subsample of births turns out to be extremely useful, and we   
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will discuss below the extent to which inferences based on births can be carried forward, first, to 
the subset of permanent establishments and then the entire sample of surveyed units. 
As shown in Table 6, we observe 2,679 births in the 1999-2007 period. Of the total 
number  of  births,  there  are  266  collective  agreement  transitions  in  the  2001-2008  interval, 
comprising 149 leavers and 117 joiners. In other words, 9.9 percent of all births either switched 
into or out of a collective agreement during the sample period. 
(Table 6 near here) 
Table 6 also gives the collective agreement status in the year of birth and in the year of 
exit for all births in the sample, as well as the average year of exit (i.e. self-rotation or transition 
into a different state) for each cohort. For example, an establishment born in 1999 is observed 
over an average period of 2.6 years before switching to a different regime or leaving the panel. 
Interestingly, the expected year of exit for our sample is virtually the same for covered and 
uncovered establishments. In any event, for establishments born later in the period, the average 
number  of  years  prior  to  exit  is  necessarily  smaller  given  that  their  number  of  years  in  the 
observation window becomes shorter. 
From the total number of births in our dataset, and ignoring the 2007 cohort for which no 
transitions can be observed, in 52.2 percent of the cases establishments remain non-covered and 
37.9 percent remain covered. This implies, as we have seen, that in 9.9 percent [100-(52.2+37.9)] 
of the cases we do observe establishments changing – either leaving or joining – their collective 
agreement status. Of those plants that are covered in the year of birth, some 12.8 percent do 
switch out of collective agreement within the observation window, while 7.7 percent of their non-
covered counterparts will join a collective agreement. (Multiple failures – establishments with 
more than one transition over the observation period – are now dropped from our sample.)  
   The results of model (2) – the hazard function – are presented in Table 7 for the two 
possible failure events: leaving a collective agreement and joining one (first and second columns 
of the table, respectively). In the last row of the table, we also present the median duration of  
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coverage/‘uncoverage,’ based on a PH exponential model without covariates. According to our 
estimates, the median duration of coverage for newly-founded establishments is approximately 
two years, while the median duration of uncoverage is around three years. 
(Table 7 near here) 
As  for  the  role  of  the  selected  covariates,  greater  establishment  size  decreases  the 
probability of leaving a collective agreement, as does the use of modern technology. In contrast, 
foreign ownership and single-establishment status are associated with a higher failure rate. Note 
that the role of single-establishment status and foreign-owned variables are particularly strong; in 
particular, being a single establishment implies an 83 percent higher hazard rate, while foreign-
ownership increases the hazard by 58 percent. In turn, a 1 percent increase in establishment size 
reduces the hazard by 0.35 percent. All other covariates included in the regression are poorly 
determined.  
The results for joining a collective agreement of any sort (second column) look quite 
symmetric, such that where the probability of leaving a collective agreement is found in the first 
column of the table to be decreasing in employment size, it is now increasing in employment size 
when  it  comes  to  joining  an  agreement.  But  no  other  covariate  is  found  to  be  statistically 
significant. Vulgo: establishment size is the major determinant of joining a collective agreement. 
The evidence is much weaker in the case of transitions into collective agreements,  however, 
which is not altogether unexpected given the smaller number of establishments engaging in such 
switching behavior. 
We recall that in our observation window all units are left-censored except for newly-
founded plants. Since we cannot recover the entire record on collective bargaining participation in 
respect of the left-censored units, we can either ignore all transitions other than in the case of the 
sample  of  births  or  instead  try  to  figure  out  an  alternative  procedure  that  avoids  losing  the 
valuable transition information we have on other types of establishments.   
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We chose the second route and therefore create a constructed pre-observation period in 
which collective agreement status is unchanged for all units included in the risk analysis. To this 
end, we (a) divide the 2000-2008 period into the two sub-periods 2000-2003 and 2004-2008, (b) 
use the set of permanent establishments (these units were observed for a reasonably long period 
of time anyway), and (c) impose the additional restriction of no change in status from 2000 to 
2003. Transitions in the 2004-2008 interval will then be used to estimate the hazard. We will refer 
to this sample as the ‘restricted sample of permanent establishments.’ (Note that in enlarging the 
‘pre-observation’ period from 2000-2003 to 2000-2004, for example, we reduced the risk period 
with no appreciable change in the results, other than a slight decrease in significance levels.) 
In a second stage, and to test the role of left-censoring in our results – and ultimately 
evaluate whether the use of left-censored data in our survival analysis is legitimate – we added to 
the restricted sample of permanent establishments all those units in which collective bargaining 
status prior to 2004 is not fixed.
12 Taking, for example, the case of covered establishments this 
counterfactual  exercise  serves  to  compare  the  results  from  an  experiment  in  which  the  left-
censored units are necessarily covered with the case in which the presumed fixed coverage prior 
to 2004 is false for some units – and similarly for the case where the initial state is non-coverage. 
If the determinants of the hazard rate in the two counterfactual experiments are not too different 
(that  is,  where  the  hazard  is  not  too  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  selected  samples),  we  may 
conclude that left-censoring for permanent units of the panel is not really an issue, and that 
running the survival analysis on an ‘unrestricted’ set of permanent establishments is not too much 
of a stretch. In this vein, our third and final exercise applies the survival model to all permanent 
establishments observed in 2000-2008 period, without further restrictions. Again, in this case we 
are simply ignoring left-censoring, implicitly assuming that either there was no change in status in 
the past (i.e. before 2000) or, alternatively, that it occurred too long ago to be a matter of concern. 
We have exactly 1,448 establishments in the restricted estimation sample of permanent 
establishments, of which 821 (627) were covered (not covered) in 2000-2003. Of those that were  
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covered (in 2000-2003), 93 switched out of collective bargaining between 2004 and 2008 – 93 
out of 821, or 11 percent. Of those that were not covered, 35 switched into collective agreements 
after 2003 – 35 out of 627, or 6 percent. 
The corresponding survival analysis, shown in the first column of Table 8, again indicates 
that establishment size is critical: the larger the establishment, the lower the probability that a 
covered establishment will leave a collective agreement. The single establishment variable is also 
well determined, and positively signed as expected. All the other variables are poorly determined. 
In turn, as shown in the second column of the table, joining collective agreements is a lot less 
common among permanents than among newly-founded establishments; recall that the number of 
observed  failures  is  only  one-third  that  of  the  number  of  transitions  out  of  coverage.  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, all variables in the second column are statistically insignificant, with the 
sole exception of the establishment age dummy. In this case, older establishments tend to have a 
lower exit rate (from non-coverage). Apparently, non-covered establishments tend to stay non-
covered, while the considerable minority that join collective agreements do not seem to share any 
particularly visible characteristics.  
(Table 8 near here) 
The second experiment – the counterfactual – is given in Table 9. In this exercise, we 
added some 50 establishments to the sample in the first column of Table 8. The results are 
basically  unchanged,  so  that  we  conclude  that  once  we  observe  the  state  (coverage)  of  a 
permanent establishment, transition behavior tends to be quite predictable. The same obtains with 
respect  to  the  transition  behavior  of  initially  uncovered  establishments,  shown  in  the  second 
column, where some 100 establishments have been added to the sample. The main implication 
from the counterfactual is, again, that within the subsample of permanent establishments there 
seems to be no particular penalty in ignoring left-censoring. 
(Tables 9 and 10 near here)  
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Given these findings, the final step is to present the survival analysis for the full set of 
permanent establishments. This procedure yields an enlarged estimation sample of 1,597 units, 
surveyed  consecutively  from  2000  to  2008.  Of  this  total,  we  have  exactly  922  (675) 
establishments that were covered (not covered) by any type of collective agreement in 2000, and 
275 transitions comprising 193 leavers and 82 joiners. The results are presented in Table 10. As 
expected, the results reported in the table mimic those obtained earlier in Table 8. From this 
perspective, it appears legitimate to conclude that in the case of permanent panel members there 
is enough evidence to support the proposition that plant size and skill content of the workforce 
matter in terms of collective bargaining survivability, while single establishment status favors the 
abandonment of collective bargaining. The influence of the remaining covariates on survivability 
of collective agreements is statistically weak but nevertheless mildly visible, with the exception 
of the establishment age variable. However, it is more difficult to discern equally strong patterns 
in respect of transitions into collective agreements. Here, size and, to some limited extent, foreign 
ownership are the unique determinants, with again strikingly symmetric effects. 
 
VIII. Conclusions  
The  steady  decline in  collective  bargaining  coverage  in  Germany  has  been  documented in  a 
patchwork fashion in the extant literature. Based on a detailed analysis of its development over 
the last decade, this paper establishes that the downward trend identified in that literature has 
likely not come to a halt, although there is no real indication of any continued substitution within 
collective bargaining (i.e. of multi-employer, sectoral agreements being replaced by firm level 
agreements).  That  process  seems  to  have  been  sidelined  by  the  decentralization  of  sectoral 
bargaining, not that we can yet speak of a clear process of organized decentralization. Nor for that 
matter do plant births or deaths emerge as the main driving force behind the observed fall in 
collective  bargaining  coverage.  Rather,  the  decline  appears  to  be  across  the  board,  affecting  
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regions, sectors, small and large firms alike, and proceeding irrespective of the establishment’s 
workforce composition.
13   
Our  multivariate  shift-share  analysis  suggests  that  changes  in  establishment 
characteristics play a small role on the course of collective bargaining over the observed period. 
The main source, therefore, is attributable to behavioral effects, even if no single factor can easily 
be identified as the chief suspect. What is clear is that economic circumstances are such that 
establishments in the late 2000s are definitely less prone to be covered than they were earlier in 
the decade. Globalization might be a good candidate: all else constant, increased product market 
competition is likely to stimulate a move away from ‘sticky’ collective agreements. This trend is 
also revealed by our analysis of ‘membership,’ or establishment coverage, where it is shown that 
unobserved establishment traits can explain much of the variation in coverage.  
Despite the role played by unobserved heterogeneity, however, our duration analysis had 
shown that the set of regressors deployed here have non-negligible predictive power. That is to 
say, we are able to explain a material part of transitions into and out of collective agreements, 
especially in the case of the decision to leave collective bargaining agreements. Based primarily 
on a very careful coding of all births in the sample and then on a thorough modeling of left-
censored permanent establishments, we were able to present – for the first time to our knowledge 
– the median duration of coverage and ‘uncoverage’ for newly-founded establishments, while at 
the  same  time  offering  an  analysis  of  collective  bargaining  transitions  for  other  types  of 
establishments. 
Although we cannot provide conclusive evidence that the decline in collective bargaining 
is irreversible, it is unquestionably the case that the German model is under stress. To be sure, our 
finding  of  considerable  inertia  in  the  process  is  not  consonant  with  the  claim  that  German 
collective bargaining is currently an endangered species on the U.S. (private-sector) pattern, but 
even here others have suggested that this inertia is undergirded by political support, without  
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which the erosion of the German system of industrial relations would be even more rapid and 
more pronounced (e.g. Hassel, 2002). 
The consequences of changes in collective bargaining will form the next stage in our 
empirical inquiry, the first step of which will be to determine whether wages are lower in plants 
that  abandon  industry-level  collective  bargaining,  and  if  not  whether,  say,  organized 
decentralization  (in  the  German  terminology)  allows  sufficient  adaptation  to  changing 
circumstances. Such work should assist in our understanding of the efficacy of existing broad-
based classifications of collective bargaining systems used in macro treatments. It will also have a 






1. See Kohaut and Schnabel (2001), Kohaut and Schnabel (2003b), Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and 
Kohaut (2006).  
2. Hassel (1999, 2002), in particular, is also concerned to stress the role of the works council 
because  its  purported  decline  necessarily  limits  what  can  be  expected  of  organized 
decentralization; that is to say, the transfer of collective bargaining functions from the collective 
bargaining arena to plant level is only viable where works councils are actually in place. 
3. A breakdown of collective agreement and worker representation coverage for plants that are 
observed in both 2000 and 2008 (i.e. stayers) offers the same broad pattern: a growth in the 
collective bargaining free zone; a certain decline in sectoral bargaining (albeit somewhat less 
obvious than earlier reported); a shrinking works council sector; and volatile levels of firm-level 
bargaining. Regarding births and deaths, however, there is indication that absence of collective 
bargaining is higher among newly-born firms for both coverage measures (with the growth rate 
being much higher for the employment measure). Sectoral bargaining is more common among 
dying establishments, again on either measure.  Newly-born establishments are also less likely to 
have  works  councils  than  dying  establishments,  which  serves  to  confirm  the  growth  of  a 
codetermination-free zone. Full details are available from the authors upon request. 
4. Our findings are robust to probit estimation, with within- and between components of virtually 
the same size as those reported below. Full results of the probit exercise are available from the 
authors upon request. 
5. We note that the decomposition is insensitive to the choice of reference groups, with the 
possible exception of eastern Germany where the within effect tends to be larger when the 2008 
coefficients are selected as the reference category.  
6. As a matter of fact, for the whole of Germany and for western Germany the (statistically weak) 
evidence suggests that the observed changes in establishment characteristics are per se favorable  
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to a higher coverage of firm-level agreements, while for eastern Germany the within effect is 
again dominant. 
7. The equivalent latent variable model is given by 
*
it it i it Y X u e , where 
*
it Y  is the latent 
variable  and  (0,1) it eN ,  with  it e   uncorrelated  with  i u .  Assuming 
* Pr( 1| , ) Pr( 0| , ) it i it it i it Y u X Y u X , model (1) follows easily. 
8. We cannot offer a similar exercise for ρ since it does not depend on the marginal distribution. 
9. For the time-varying covariates, we shall ignore possible anticipation and delay effects. We 
shall also assume that the effect of any continuous variable on the hazard is independent of the 
level of the variable (i.e. the marginal effect is constant). A model without covariates will be used 
to  obtain  the  predicted  median  duration  of  coverage/‘uncoverage’  for  newly-founded 
establishments (see Table 7). 
10. Formally, the model in equation (3) is PH with time-invariant covariates; the corresponding 
PH  model  with  time-varying  variables  is  given  by  0 [ ; ( )] ( )exp[ ( ) ] h t X t h t X t (see 
Wooldridge, 2002: 693). 
11. The year of birth of any establishment in the panel is always known; only the bargaining 
status in the pre-observation period is unknown. 
12. For transitions into collective agreements, this amounts to adding the following sequences to 
the  existing  restricted  sample  of  permanents:  0111|11111,  0011|11111,  0001|11111,  and 
0000|11111.  In  the  case  of  transitions  out  of  collective  agreements,  we  add  the  sequences 
1111|00000,  1110|00000,  1100|00000,  and  1000|00000.  The  vertical  bar  in  these  sequences 
denotes the 2003 separation point and ‘1’ (‘0’) signifies coverage (‘uncoverage’). The 2004-2008 
interval defines the risk period. 
13. Note that if one is ready to accept that covered establishments suffer from lower employment, 
employment growth will be concentrated in non-covered establishments, which fact can only 
imply an inevitable decline in collective bargaining in the long-run. But in the presence of pro-
productive collective voice, the optimal mix of covered establishments in the economy is likely to 
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Variable description and means of the raw sample 








Any type of collective agreement  Dummy  0.527      82,137 
Sectoral agreement  Dummy  0.458      82,137 
Firm-level agreement  Dummy  0.069      82,137 
Works council  Dummy  0.340  82,137 
Log number of employees  Continuous  3.685      82,137 
Use of modern technology  Dummy  0.693      80,146 
Proportion of skilled workers  Percent   67.355      82,118 
Proportion of female workers  Percent  37.845      82,004 
Foreign majority ownership   Dummy   0.072      80,715 
Single establishment  Dummy  0.713      81,400 
Establishment older than 10 years  Dummy  0.650      81,769 
Regional dummies (16)  Dummy    82,137 
Industry dummies (37)  Dummy    82,137 
Notes: In coding the works council and collective agreement variables, we assumed that if the 
status in year t-1was the same as in year t+1, then the status in year t was unchanged. This 
assumption resulted in 0.5 and 3.3 percent of all works council and collective agreement 






Collective bargaining and works council coverage (in percent) by employment and by 
establishment [establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section weighted data, 2000 and 
2008] 
  2000  2008 
Germany  West  East  Germany  West  East 
No collective 
agreement 
Employment  34.3  31.5  48.4  42.8  40.6  54.4 
Establishment  48.9  44.4  67.2  60.8  58.1  71.9 
Firm-level agreement  Employment  7.0  6.4  9.9  8.0  7.3  11.3 
Establishment  2.8  2.4  4.5  2.8  2.3  4.5 
Sectoral 
 agreement 
Employment  58.7  62.1  41.7  49.2  52.1  34.3 
Establishment  48.3  53.2  28.3  36.4  39.5  23.6 
Works council  Employment  46.9  48.6  38.7  42.6  44.2  35.0 





Within versus compositional change by type of agreement and by region, 2000 and 2008, 
weighted data 
    Germany  West  East 
(a) Collective agreements of any type  2000  2008  2000  2008  2000  2008 
(1)  Observed coverage rate  51.2  39.2  55.7  41.9  33.1  28.1 
(2)  Percentage point change, 2000-2008    -12.0    -13.8    -5.0 
(3)  2008 (predicted) coverage based on 2000 
coefficients  
  51.0    55.5    34.1 
(4)  2000 (predicted) coverage based on 2008 
coefficients 
40.0    42.7    28.1   
(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in 
characteristics based on 2000 coefficients 
  -0.2 
(1.5%) 
  -0.2 
(1.3%) 
  1.1 
(-21.9%) 
(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in 
behavior based on 2000 coefficients  
  -11.9 
(98.5%) 
  -13.7 
(98.7%) 
  -6.1 
(121.9%) 
  (b) Sectoral agreements                   
(1)  Observed coverage rate (%)  48.5  36.5  53.5  39.5  28.5  23.7 
(2)  Percentage point change, 2000-2008    -12.1    -13.9    -4.8 
(3)  2008 (predicted) coverage based on 2000 
coefficients  
  47.9    52.8    29.0 
(4)  2000 (predicted) coverage based on 2008 
coefficients 
37.5    40.7    23.8   
(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in 
characteristics based on 2000 coefficients  
  -0.7 
(5.4%) 
  -0.7 
(5.0%) 
  0.5 
(-9.5%) 
(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in 
behavior based on 2000 coefficients  
  -11.4 
(94.6%) 
  -13.2 
(95.0%) 
  -5.3 
(109.5%) 
Notes: The within effect is always statistically significant at the .01 level, other than for panel (c),while 
the between effect is never statistically significant. The between effect in row (5) is given by row (3) 





Coverage propensity by type of collective agreement, random-effects probit estimates, 
weighted data, 2000-2008 
   Any collective 
agreement 
Sectoral agreement   Firm-level 
agreement 
Log number of employees   0.977 (0.021)***   0.667(0.021) ***   0.454 (0.022)*** 
Use of modern technology   0.019 (0.030)   0.033 (0.030)  -0.089 (0.039)** 
Proportion of skilled workers   0.004 (0.001)***   0.002 (0.001)   0.004 (0.001)*** 
Proportion of female workers  -0.001 (0.001)   0.0006 (0.001)  -0.004 (0.001)*** 
Foreign majority ownership   0.155 (0.085)   0.071 (0.084)   0.062 (0.079) 
Single establishment  -0.643 (0.045)***  -0.447 (0.045)***  -0.393 (0.048)*** 
Establishment older than 10 years   1.176 (0.068)***   1.288 (0.071)***  -0.067 (0.060) 
Region dummies   yes  yes  yes 
Industry dummies   yes  yes  yes 
u    3.714 (0.051)   3.897 (0.053)   2.577 (0.040) 
   0.932 (0.002)   0.938 (0.002)      0.869 (0.004) 
Wald 
2   7595.08  7557.03  938.16 
Number of observations  80,958  80,958  80,958 
Number of establishments  24,018  24,018  24,018 
Notes: The model is given by equation (1) in the text.  u is the standard deviation of the unobserved effect 
i u , and   is the latent intra-group (establishment) correlation. The model specification also contains 16 
regional  dummies,  37  two-digit  industry  dummies,  and  8  year  dummies.  Standard  errors  are  given  in 









0.01  0.25  0.50  0.75  0.99 
(a) Any collective agreement            
Marginal probability  0.047  0.340  0.526  0.715  0.965 
Joint probability  0.032  0.286  0.467  0.665  0.954 
Pearson's r  0.681  0.759  0.764  0.755  0.668 
Odds ratio  152.118  59.430  56.248  62.534  182.264 
(b) Sectoral agreements           
Marginal probability  0.033  0.260  0.444  0.622  0.921 
Joint probability  0.022  0.214  0.387  0.569  0.900 
Pearson's r  0.680  0.763  0.774  0.772  0.718 
Odds ratio  211.653  71.535  62.705  64.312  124.701 
(c) Firm-level agreements           
Marginal probability  0.009  0.032  0.056  0.094  0.280 
Joint probability  0.004  0.018  0.033  0.060  0.211 
Pearson's r  0.473  0.541  0.572  0.602  0.657 
Odds ratio  186.059  82.865  60.012  45.389  28.659 
Notes: The reported statistics are obtained using the command xtrho in Stata 10, and are described in 
Rodriguez and Elo (2003). In the case of panel (a), for example, the 95% confidence intervals for the 
median percentile are (0.527, 0.526), (0.467, 0.468), 0.758, 0.770), and (52.681, 59.098), respectively. See 






Beginning- and end-period collective agreement status of newly-founded 
establishments, 2000-2008, unweighted data 
 
Year of birth 
Collective agreement status in year 
of birth+1 
Collective agreement status in 
year of exit 
Year of 
exit  
(average)  Status  n  Anycb=0  Anycb=1 
1999  Anycb=0  150  132  18  2002.6 
Anycb=1  124  19  105  2002.6 
Total  274  151  123  2002.6 
2000  Anycb=0  138  129  9  2003.1 
Anycb=1  118  17  101  2003.4 
Total  256  146  110  2003.2 
2001  Anycb=0  172  159  13  2004.3 
Anycb=1  112  11  101  2004.1 
Total  284  170  114  2004.2 
2002  Anycb=0  68  64  4  2005.1 
Anycb=1  38  6  32  2005.9 
Total  106  70  36  2005.4 
2003  Anycb=0  253  231  22  2006.0 
Anycb=1  198  20  178  2006.0 
Total  451  251  200  2006.0 
2004  Anycb=0  203  185  18  2006.7 
Anycb=1  195  37  158  2006.7 
Total  398  222  176  2006.7 
2005  Anycb=0  241  230  11  2007.3 
Anycb=1  178  17  161  2007.3 
Total  419  247  172  2007.3 
2006  Anycb=0  290  268  22  2007.7 
Anycb=1  201  22  179  2007.7 
Total  491  290  201  2007.7 
2007  Anycb=0  278       
Anycb=1  226       
Total  504       
Notes: A newly-founded establishment in the 2000 (2001, …, 2008) survey is a unit born in 
1999 (2000, …, 2007). Consequently, all 2008 births (i.e. establishments born in 2008) are 
discarded in our subsequent survival analysis. Also note that all establishments born in, say, 
2002 but not observed (surveyed) before 2006, for example, are dropped from the sample. In 
other words, only those establishments that can be followed from the outset (year of birth) are 
included in the estimation sample. Exit means rotation out of the panel or failure (end of the 







Cox proportional hazard model estimates, newly-founded establishments, 
2000-2008, unweighted data 
  Leaving any type of 
collective agreement 
 
Joining any type of collective 
agreement 
Log number of employees  -0.348 (0.068)***   0.349 (0.092)*** 
Use of modern technology  -0.500 (0.157)***   0.011 (0.203) 
Proportion of skilled workers  -0.004 (0.003)   0.002 (0.004) 
Proportion of female workers  -0.007 (0.004)*   0.001 (0.004) 
Foreign majority ownership   0.460 (0.273)*  -0.490 (0.449) 
Single establishment    0.604 (0.215)***  -0.032 (0.245) 
     
Number of observations  1,787  2,362 
Number of establishments  787  1,003 
Number of failures  145  117 
Wald 
2   81.47  73.91 
       
Predicted median duration  1.81  2.61 
Notes: The hazard function is given by equation (2). The model includes 7 industry dummies and 
1 region (western Germany). Clustered standard errors are given in parentheses. The Wald test 
rejects the null of no joint statistical significance of the model. The (predicted) median duration in 




Cox proportional hazard model estimates, restricted sample of permanent establishments, 
2004-2008, unweighted data 
 
   Leaving any type of 
collective agreement 
Joining any type of collective 
agreement 
 
Log number of employees  -0.241 (0.074)***   0.050 (0.237) 
Use of modern technology   0.150 (0.232)   0.447 (0.447) 
Proportion of skilled workers  -0.002 (0.005)   0.007 (0.012) 
Proportion of female workers  -0.001 (0.005)  -0.001 (0.009) 
Foreign majority ownership  -0.788 (0.598)   0.434 (0.855) 
Single establishment    1.002 (0.303)***  -0.431 (0.486) 
Establishment age   0.072 (0.280)  -0.694 (0.385)* 
     
Number of observations  3,928  3,051 
Number of establishments  821  627 
Number of failures  93  35 
Wald 
2   76.89  8,783.72 




Cox proportional hazard model estimates, restricted sample of permanent establishments, 
2004-2008, unweighted data (counterfactual) 
 
  Leaving any type of 
collective agreement 
Joining any type of collective 
agreement 
 
Log number of employees  -0.224 (0.074)***   0.055 (0.236) 
Use of modern technology   0.175 (0.234)   0.461 (0.445) 
Proportion of skilled workers  -0.002 (0.005)   0.008 (0.012) 
Proportion of female workers  -0.009 (0.005)*  -0.0001 (0.009) 
Foreign majority ownership  -0.810 (0.597)   0.492 (0.853) 
Single establishment    0.976 (0.305)***  -0.384 (0.478) 
Establishment age   0.123 (0.287)  -0.763 (0.386)** 
     
Number of observations  4,163  3,551 
Number of establishments  868  727 
Number of failures  93  35 
Wald 
2   75.45  28.22 (0.0133) 







Cox proportional hazard model estimates, sample of permanent establishments, 2000-
2008, unweighted data 
 
  Leaving any type of 
collective agreement 
Joining any type of collective 
agreement 
 
Log number of employees  -0.367 (0.054)***   0.224 (0.122)** 
Use of modern technology   0.245 (0.165)   0.193 (0.272) 
Proportion of skilled workers  -0.006 (0.003)**   0.0004 (0.005) 
Proportion of female workers  -0.005 (0.003)  -0.011 (0.006)** 
Foreign majority ownership  -0.630 (0.422)   0.623 (0.462) 
Single establishment   0.648 (0.198)***  -0.337 (0.298) 
Establishment age  -0.212 (0.169)   0.074 (0.247) 
     
Number of observations  7,486  5,697 
Number of establishments  922  675 
Number of failures  193  82 
Wald 
2   147.56  31.45 




Collective bargaining and works council coverage, 2000-2008 
(establishments with at least 5 employees; cross-section weighted data)  
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Collective bargaining and works council coverage by employment, 2000-2008, cross-
section weighted data 
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Collective bargaining and works council coverage by establishment, 2000-2008, cross-
section weighted data 
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Collective bargaining and works council coverage by employment, 2000-2008, cross-
section weighted data 
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Collective bargaining and works council coverage by establishment, 2000-2008, cross-
section weighted data 
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Legend:   t – left-truncation point  
  c – right-censoring point 
  s – starting time of the event (or entry to a state) 
  e – ending time of the event (or exit from a state) 
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